Integration of Military Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) into the US National Airspace System: The Relationship Between UAS Accidents and Safety Concerns by Hamilton, Omar J et al.
International Journal of Aviation, 
Aeronautics, and Aerospace 
Volume 4 Issue 1 Article 6 
1-24-2017 
Integration of Military Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) into the 
US National Airspace System: The Relationship Between UAS 
Accidents and Safety Concerns 
Omar J. Hamilton 
Oklahoma State University, omar.hamilton@okstate.edu 
Timm J. Bliss 
Oklahoma State University, timm.bliss@okstate.edu 
Chad Depperschmidt 
Oklahoma State University, chad.depperschmidt@okstate.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa 
 Part of the Aviation Safety and Security Commons, and the Management and Operations Commons 
Scholarly Commons Citation 
Hamilton, O. J., Bliss, T. J., & Depperschmidt, C. (2017). Integration of Military Unmanned Aerial Systems 
(UAS) into the US National Airspace System: The Relationship Between UAS Accidents and Safety 
Concerns. International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, 4(1). https://doi.org/10.15394/
ijaaa.2017.1150 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace by an authorized 
administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu. 
By passing the Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Congress created 
potential safety hazards by proposing the introduction of aircraft into an already 
congested national airspace (NAS) (FAA, 2014). The FAA has established 
saturation of the NAS in congested areas and recognizes the limitation of growth 
unless major changes are made to the NAS (FAA, 2011). The introduction of 
UAS into the public aviation system is a new venture that may have negative 
effects on the operational safety of the NAS, as well as a negative public 
perception.  Unknowns pertaining to effects on safety include midair collision 
avoidance, terrain avoidance and lost link incidents.  The US Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) has identified many of the safety concerns defined 
in the Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. However, some key issues 
remained incomplete (US GAO, 2014). 
 
 Several studies based on UAS features and the ability for the aircraft to 
meet safety standards were recently conducted.  One such study, by Cuerno-
Rejado, C., & Martínez-Val, R. (2011), addressed UAS civil airworthiness and 
the regulatory efforts from manufacturers’ standpoint and how they compare to 
the operational procedures.  Another conducted by Casarosa, C., Galatolo, R., 
Mengali, G., & Quarta, A. (2004), before the new legislation passed, suggested 
that, “The lack of airworthiness and certification criteria for the employment of 
UAS vehicles in the civilian field has caused an uncontrolled proliferation of 
projects and the construction of a number of UAS prototypes which differ in 
dimension, weight, flight characteristics and payload carriage (Casarosa, 2004).”  
Even though these studies address safety, there has not been research conducted 
on the safety concerns with comparison to the accident record. 
 
Purpose of the Study 
 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the most common unmanned 
aerial system (UAS) accidents from 2009-2014 and determine if a relationship 
between actual UAS accidents and safety concerns regarding their integration into 
the National Airspace System (NAS) existed.  The research survey and interview 
questions created by the researchers explored the most common safety concerns 
and why they were a specific concern of US Air Force (USAF) UAS pilots and 
sensor operators.  
 
Research Objective and Questions 
 
The research methodology was designed with the intent of producing 
qualitative and quantitative results to answer the following research objective and 
related research questions. Research Objective:  Based on the most common UAS 
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accidents causes and US Air Force UAS instructor and evaluator pilots and sensor 
operators opinions, is there a relationship between safety concerns and safety 
issues?   
Research Questions: 
 
1. What safety features could prevent midair collisions? 
2. What safety features may prevent accidents during lost link events? 
3. How many lost link incidents have occurred ending with accidents? 
4. How many lost link incidents have occurred ending without accidents? 
5. What are the most common UAS accidents within the last five years?  
6. Have UAS meeting airworthiness requirements been involved in more 
accidents than UAS not meeting airworthiness requirements? 
7. How do current and proposed safety features integrated into a UAS 
prevent the most common accident occurrences?  
8. Does UAS pilot training reduce the number of UAS accidents? 
 
Research Approach 
 
The quantitative approach was conducted to find the most common causes 
of UAS incidents, accidents and mishaps between June 2009 and June 2014 
through the use of online databases.  To receive expert opinions on safety, the 
qualitative research method consisted of a research survey (Appendix A) and 
interview questions (Appendix B) created for US Air Force UAS instructors and 
evaluator pilots and sensor operators.  The information gathered from the 
qualitative approach was compared to the quantitative findings to determine 
whether a relationship between the safety concerns and safety records existed. 
 
Methodology 
 
Quantitative Data Collection and Analysis 
 
This study referenced US Air Force (USAF), Navy (USN) and Army 
(USA) accident databases to complete the quantitative data collection on UAS 
accidents in the last five years and to determine the most common causes for 
accidents.  The information was solicited via Freedom of Information Act formal 
requests to the Navy and Army Safety Institutions.  The Air Force data was 
compiled from the USAF Judge Advocate General public webpage.  The 
information collected from all services was not always complete due to the nature 
of the operations in which the UAS was used.  The USN and USA did not provide 
specific dates or years, but did conform to the five-year period in the study, while 
the USAF did provide that information.  The data was compiled using a manual 
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tracking method to conclude if there were specific factors for the preponderance 
of accidents, and to show any significant difference in the accidents based on 
operator factors or equipment factors. 
 
The data collected for the quantitative study was analyzed manually.  
Since the data was tracked manually, each accident was placed into accident class 
categories that included: USAF- Class A & Unknown; USN- Class A, B, C, H 
and USA- Class A, B, C, D, E. Within the class categories, the accidents were 
categorized by causal category:  pilot error (PE), engine failure (E), loss of 
controls (CT), lost link (LL) and other (O).  Additionally, causal categories were 
categorized by period of flight: takeoff (TO), cruise (CR), landing (L) and other 
(O).  From the selected categories, the totals were added to find the most common 
causal for the accident and most common period of flight.  Lastly, categories of 
impacts with structures, near midair and midair collisions were recorded by the 
researchers. 
 
Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis 
 
Seven US Air Force instructor and evaluator UAS pilots and sensor 
operators were recruited to support the qualitative data collection. Due to Air 
Force regulations, the pilots and sensor operators could not provide support 
during duty hours or from government computers so the researchers used private 
emails and phone numbers to forward the research survey and conduct the 
interview.  The seven pilots and sensor operators who completed the survey were 
also asked to participate in the interview element of this study. Three participants 
participated in the interview process.  To provide a scalable measure of concerns, 
a Likert-type scale was used for the survey.  The interviews were conducted to 
provide supporting data that could not be measured by the research survey.     
 
The qualitative data was collected in two manners: (1) Likert-type scale 
and (2) personal interviews of each pilot and sensor operator.  The qualitative 
Likert-type scale and participant answers were created and compiled by use of an 
online survey service, Survey Monkey.  The online survey database provided the 
capability to analyze data trends of answers.  The database was able to provide 
support to find the mean, mode and median for each completed survey.  The 
interviews were recorded and transcribed for coding using SPSS Statistics, a 
software package used for statistical analysis. Approval was granted from the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) at Oklahoma State University prior to 
conducting the study. 
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Instrument Validity and Reliability 
 
The validation of a survey instrument allows the researchers to draw 
meaningful and justifiable inferences from participant data (Creswell, 2004).  
Regarding the reliability of the instrument, Creswell (2004) states that individual 
scores from an instrument should be reasonably constant or stable across repeated 
presentations of the instrument.  The two research instruments used in this study 
(i.e. safety concern questionnaire and the interview questions) were validated by 
testing with a small group of military pilots and sensor operators associated with 
unmanned aerial systems. Furthermore, a small group of aviation academicians 
reviewed and provided revisions to both instruments.  For both instruments, this 
resulted in the elimination and replacement of several questions, as well as the 
rewording of other questions for clarity. 
 
Findings 
 
Between 2009 and 2014, there were 417 reported accidents by the US Air 
Force (USAF), US Navy (USN) and US Army (USA) involving UAS.  Of those 
accidents, the USAF reported 45, USA reported 324 and the USN reported 48.  
Due to the sensitive nature of the UAS usage, not all services provided a 
breakdown of accidents by year, but provided the number of accidents and causes 
between the time-period requested 2009-2014.  The USAF did break down 
accidents by years; these included 11 accidents in 2009, 7 accidents in 2010, 14 
accidents in 2011, 10 accidents in 2012, and 3 accidents in 2013; 2014 numbers 
were not available at the time of this study.  Each military service accident 
database was categorized into classes relevant to the specific service definition of 
accident class; Table 1 differentiates the numbers of accidents by class and 
service that were included in this study. 
 
Accident Classes 
 
A total of 417 total UAS accidents reported in five distinct classes from 
2009-2014 between these three US military services.  Of the 417 UAS accidents 
included in the study, the data show a disparity between accident numbers and 
classes between the three services.  For example, the USAF and USA both had 38 
and 35 Class A accidents during this time period, while the USN reported 8, but 
had 20 Class H accidents; the USAF and USA did not provide Class H 
information.  To help explain this disparity, the definitions of each class are 
defined below to show similarities and differences of accident types. These 
accident classes are defined by Air Force AFI91-204 (2014), Army Regulation 
385-10 (2013), Operational Navy Instruction (OPNAV) 3750.6S (2014), 
4
International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 4 [2017], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol4/iss1/6
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2017.1150
Department of Defense (DOD) (2011) and Naval Aviation Safety Management 
System (OPNAVINST) 3750.6S (2014). 
 
Table 1 
Accident Class Totals 
 
 
 Air Force Navy Army 
Class Totals  45 48 324 
A 38 8 35 
B 0 5 72 
C 0 15 159 
D 0 N/A 57 
E N/A N/A 1 
H N/A 20 N/A 
Unknown 7 0 0 
 
 
Class A Accidents: 
 Resulted in death 
 Resulted in permanent total disability 
 Resulted in damage equal to or greater than $2 million dollars 
 Resulted in a destroyed aircraft (excluding UAS groups 1, 2, or 3) 
 
Class B Accidents:  
 Resulted in permanent partial disability 
 Resulted in damage equal to or greater than $500,000 dollars 
 Resulted in hospitalization for inpatient care of three or more individuals (not 
including observation or diagnostic care) 
 
Class C Accidents: 
 Resulted in a nonfatal injury or occupational illness that caused loss of 1 or 
more days from work not including the day or shift it occurred (lost-workday 
case) 
 Resulted in damage equal to or greater than $50,000 dollars 
 
Class D Accidents:  
 Resulted in a recordable injury or illness not otherwise classified as class A, 
B, or C 
 Resulted in damage equal to or greater than $20,000 dollars 
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Class E Accidents: 
 An Army accident resulting in total cost of property damage equal to or 
greater than $5,000 but less than $20,000 
 
Class H Accidents: 
 Hazard is delineated as an “H” in the severity code; hazards include near mid-
air collisions 
 A hazard is any real or potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or 
death to personnel; damage to or loss of a system, equipment or property; or 
damage to the environment 
 The hazard/near miss did not exceed the Class D mishap minimum property 
damage threshold of $20,000 and/or the Class D minimum injury threshold of 
first aid, loss of consciousness, light duty, limited duty 
 
The disparity between classes was noted due to the dollar amount for the 
UAS used by each service.  The USAF reported UAS accidents involving the 
MQ1B, MQ9, EQ4 and QRF-4C aircraft.  For example, each UAS is valued over 
the $2,000,000 amount listed in the Class A definition (AFI91-204), thus 38 
accidents involving UAS for the USAF during the time period researched were 
Class A and the seven not listed as Class A were unknown due to the lack of 
information on cost for repair of the UAS.   
 
The USN reported accidents involving BQM74, K-MAX, MQ-001L, MQ-
008B, MQ-9, RQ-1, RQ-2B, RQ-4A, RQ-7B, RQ-21B, RQ-23 and SCAN 
EAGLE.  The UAS operated by the USN and involved in this study.  The USA 
reported accidents involving MAV, MQ-1B, MQ-1C, MQ-5B, RQ-11, RQ-11B, 
RQ-7, RQ-20A and RQ-12A (WASP3). Figure 1 provides the reported UAS 
accidents by class from 2009-2014 timeframe. 
 
Within each class each accident was further categorized by accident cause 
and period of flight.  The accident cause categories included: pilot error (PE), 
engine (E), loss of control (CT), lost link (LL) and other (O).  The period of flight 
categories included: takeoff (T/O), cruise (CR), landing (L) and other (O).   
 
Quantitative Findings 
 
Safety concerns and safety issues relationship. From 2009 to 2014, the 
three military branches observed in this research study reported accidents caused 
by pilot error (PE), engine failure (E), loss of control (CT), lost link (LL) and 
other (O).  Figure 2 provides the most common accident causes by service, while 
Figure 3 provides the total number of accidents by cause over a five-year period. 
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Figure 1.  Accident by Class 
 
 
      
Figure 2.  Most Common Accident Causes by Service 
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 Figure 3.  Most Common Accident Causes Totals 
      
Safety concern. Seven UAS pilots and sensor operators from the USAF 
completed the research survey.  The survey consisted of 30 Likert-scale 
statements relating to flight experience, flight safety concerns during phases of 
flight and safety concerns with regards to UAS sharing the airspace with 
commercial airliners.   
 
After collecting the data from the accident databases, this data and the 
responses to the Likert-type scale were compared using observations of the data.  
An analysis of the data, employing data comparison methodologies, was 
conducted to determine whether any relationships between safety concerns and 
safety accidents existed.  Comparison between the most common accidents during 
the three phases of flight and the level of safety concerns that each research 
subject had for accidents to occur during those phases of flight was completed.  
UAS flight profiles were categorized into takeoff, cruise and landing and the most 
common accidents divided into the respective phase of flight.  
 
Research questions 
 
What safety features could prevent midair collisions? While 
conducting this study, the researchers identified 15 near mid-air collisions and 
two mid-air collisions from 2009-2014 reported by the USN and the USA.  The 
USN reported 15 near mid-air and zero mid-air collisions; and there were no 
fatalities or injuries in any of the cases reported, while the USA reported two mid-
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air collisions.  Near mid-air collisions are defined by the FAA (2016) as, “an 
incident associated with the operation of an aircraft in which a possibility of a 
collision occurs as a result of proximity of less than 500 feet to another aircraft, or 
a report is received from a pilot or flight crew member stating that a collision 
hazard existed between two or more aircraft.”  The English Dictionary (2016) 
defines mid-air collision as, “an aviation accident in which two or more aircraft 
come into contact during flight.”  The USAF did not report any near mid-air or 
mid-air collisions.   The USN near mid-air collisions consisted of nine near-mid 
air with other UAS, three near mid-air with fixed wing P-3 aircraft, one near-mid 
air with rotary wing AH-1W helicopter and two near mid-air with unknown 
aircrafts.  The USA mid-air collisions consisted of one mid-air collision between 
an RQ7B and fixed wing C-130 aircraft.  Both aircraft sustained damage but the 
accident did not result in fatalities.  The second mid-air collision occurred 
between a PUMA and an unknown (not reported) type aircraft; no fatalities were 
noted for this accident.  
 
To avoid mid-air collisions, many aircraft types (including commercial 
airlines, military, government, and some GA aircraft) use a Terrain Collision 
Avoidance System (TCAS).  The TCAS uses transponder information from 
surrounding aircraft to provide the pilots information on developing safety 
situations.  It additionally uses Terrain Advisory Line (TAL) to provide pilots 
timely information to avoid pending collisions with terrain.  However; currently, 
UAS do not have TCAS or the capability to see and avoid other aircraft.  See and 
avoid is defined in CFR 14 91.113 (b) as: 
 
When weather conditions permit, regardless of whether an operation is 
conducted under instrument flight rules or visual flight rules, vigilance 
shall be maintained by each person operating an aircraft so as to see and 
avoid other aircraft. When a rule of this section gives another aircraft the 
right-of-way, the pilot shall give way to that aircraft and may not pass 
over, under, or ahead of it unless well clear. (FAA, 2015, p. 1) 
 
According to the FAA (2013) document, Integration of Civil Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the National Airspace System (NAS) Roadmap, “sense 
and avoid (SAA) capability must provide for self-separation and ultimately for 
collision avoidance protection between UAS and other aircraft analogous to the 
‘see and avoid’ operations of manned aircraft that meets an acceptable level of 
safety,” (FAA, 2013a, p. 19).  Additionally, the FAA continues to state that, - 
“unmanned flight will require new or revised operational rules to regulate the use 
of SAA systems as an alternate method to comply with see and avoid operational 
9
Hamilton et al.: Integration of Military UAS into the US National Airspace System
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2017
rules,” (FAA, 2013a, p. 19).  With this in mind, currently not all UAS systems 
have a SAA or see and avoid capability.   
 
Technologically advanced UAS, such as the MQ-4 and other militarily 
used UAS, utilize cameras for the operators, but these cameras have a limited 
field of view.  To support the SAA and see and avoid concept, UAS aircraft and 
UAS pilots would have to acquire and develop a “see and avoid, radar, visual 
sighting, separation standards, proven technologies and procedures and well-
defined pilot behaviors,” (FAA, 2013a, p. 19) to ensure safety of flight.  To 
support the SAA and see and avoid policies, new technology with new piloting 
processes and procedures need to be developed.  Currently, Ground Based Sense 
and Avoid (GBSAA) and Airborne Sense and Avoid (ABSAA) concepts and 
procedures are being studied and evaluated by public agencies and commercial 
companies (FAAa, 2013).  These new concepts and procedures should help 
support future development of safety procedures for UAS. 
 
What safety features may prevent accidents during lost link events? 
Not all UAS have safety features for a lost link scenario; however, all UAS 
identified in this research study have a built in safety feature for lost link 
incidents.  Lost link as defined by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is, 
“an interruption or loss of the control link” (FAA, 2013b, p. 27). The safety 
feature is programmed to direct the UAS to waypoints in route to its home station 
if it loses link to its host.   
 
During this study, it was determined there were 71 total lost link 
occurrences reported from the USAF, USN, and USA.  According to the FAA 
Roadmap (2013), “air traffic products, policies and procedures need to be 
reviewed and refined or developed through supporting research to permit UAS 
operations in the NAS,” (FAA, 2013a, p. 17).  These products, policies and 
procedures include operations and contingency procedures for UAS experiencing 
lost link events.  The FAA has incorporated human factors into their contingency 
plan for dealing with lost link events, categorizing lost link events under 
“Predictability and contingency management,” (FAA, 2013a, p. 30) research 
challenge.  Figure 4 provides the number of lost link incidents by service and 
class. 
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 Figure 4.  Lost Link 
  
How many lost link incidents have occurred ending with accidents? 
As mentioned, there were 71 lost link incidents between the USAF, USA and 
USN, All 71 of the reported lost link incidents resulted in terrain or crash 
landings. 
 
How many lost link incidents have occurred ending without 
accidents? All 71 lost link incidents between the USAF, USA and USN ended 
with flight into terrain or crash landings; therefore, none of the UAS were 
reported to have landed safely. 
 
What are the most common UAS accidents within the last five years? 
UAS accidents identified in this study are predominantly attributable to pilot 
error, engine failure, loss of control, lost link and other causes (weather, electrical, 
runway overrun, etc.).  Of these common causes, the most common accident 
cause was engine failure.  From 2009-2014, a total of 145 engine failure incidents 
resulted in crashes of UAS.  The Army (USA) led the incident field with 120 
reported engine failures that resulted in a Class A, B, C or D accident.  Most of 
the USA accidents resulted in a Class C incident (74), which made up 47% of all 
Class C USA accidents reported (159).  Figure 5 illustrates engine failure by 
military service and UAS class. 
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 Figure 5.  Engine Failure 
 
Have UAS meeting airworthiness requirements been involved in more 
accidents than UAS not meeting airworthiness requirements? All UAS 
accident reports identified for this research study involved military use UAS.  As 
a military UAS, they must meet strict airworthiness standards set by the 
Department of Defense in accordance with Department of Defense Directive 
5030.61 (2013). Although military UAS may meet strict airworthiness standards, 
other non-military UAS or other aircraft may not hold the same level of 
airworthiness.     
 
For operations of UAS within the US NAS, a UAS will receive airspace 
access through issuance of Certificate of Waiver or Authorization and through 
receipt of a special airworthiness certificate, as mentioned earlier in this research.   
 
The FAA Roadmap (2013) states (in the future), “COAs and special 
airworthiness certificates will transition to more routine integration processes 
when a new revised operating rules and procedures are in place and UAS are 
capable of complying with them (FAA, 2013a, p. 5).”   
 
In the FAA Roadmap (2013), the agency states that “to gain full access to 
the NAS, UAS need to be able to bridge the gap from existing systems requiring 
accommodations to future systems that are able to obtain a standard airworthiness 
certificate (p. 6).”  This means that there needs to be a standard between all UAS 
operating in the NAS so they all meet safety standards outlined by the FAA.  
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Additionally, not only will the unmanned aircraft itself meet these “airworthiness 
standards,” but so will all subsystems and components associated with the 
unmanned system, i.e. control station, data link and unmanned aircraft.  Ideally, 
with a safety standard in place and adhered to by all UAS receiving a standard 
airworthiness certificate, safe flight operations should increase with the number of 
UAS flying within the NAS. 
 
To support meeting the certificate of waiver or authority process and to 
help mitigate the See And Avoid (SAA) issue that UAS will have, “some public 
agencies and commercial companies are seeking to develop advanced mitigations, 
such as Ground Based Sense and Avoid (GBSAA); test evaluations will help 
develop the sensor, link, and algorithm requirements that could allow GBSAA to 
function as a partial solution set for meeting SAA requirement (FAA, 2013a, pp. 
28-29).”  With the introduction of GBSAA and the continued work towards 
Airborne Sense and Avoid (ABSAA) concepts, the requirement for UAS to meet 
certification of waiver and authority requirements should make UAS flight 
operations safer. 
 
How do current and proposed safety features integrated into a UAS 
prevent the most common accident occurrences? The RQ-1 was selected 
because it is currently in use by the USAF, US Navy, Customs and Border Patrol 
as well as other US agencies that may utilize it in the future within the NAS.  The 
RQ-1 systems include an “inertial navigation system, satellite communications, 
Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) transponder, primary & secondary control 
modules, electro-optical infrared sensor and synthetic aperture RADAR (SAR),” 
(Valdes, 2015, p. 2).  These units provide some safety features for the UAS as it is 
more advanced than most commonly used UAS.  The IFF allows for flight 
following, the satellite communications allow beyond-line-of-sight control of the 
aircraft, the optical cameras ensure the pilot can see in front of and to the side of 
the aircraft during day and night time operations and the SAR supports terrain 
mapping and “seeing through haze, clouds or smoke,” (Valdes, 2015, p. 3).   
 
Though there is an array of equipment to support the safe operations of the 
UAS, they do not make up for a pilot actually being inside the aircraft.  The 
cameras that are used for the RQ-1 are limited in their side to side movement and 
UAS pilots have likened flying the aircraft to “flying an airplane while looking 
through a straw,” (Valdes, 2015, p. 6).  This sight limitation adds to the See and 
Avoid (SAA) safety issue that FAA is currently trying to overcome.  In addition 
to the SAA challenge, the RQ-1 does not carry a Terrain Collision and Avoidance 
System (TCAS).  Without TCAS the UAS pilot as well as other piloted aircraft 
within the NAS are unable to know they are on a collision heading. 
13
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The research subjects were interviewed and asked specific questions 
pertaining to safety concerns regarding integration of UAS into the NAS.  One of 
the questions posed to the research subjects was “based on your answers to the 
UAS safety questionnaire, describe in your professional opinion the top three 
greatest concerns you have with the integration of the UAS into the NAS?”  
Research Subject #3 stated one of the greatest concerns was, “the lack of TCAS.”  
An additional question posed to the research subjects was how to rectify their 
concerns; Research Subject #3 stated, “Until the equipment evolves and we have 
onboard sense and avoid, the current processes utilized by the USAF are adequate 
to reduce risk.”   
 
The results of the quantitative study within this research yielded that the 
most common accidents occurred due to engine loss during cruise.  The resulting 
accidents were due to loss of power and ended with partial or total destruction of 
the craft.  In one case, a US Army UAS lost link during landing and struck a 
vehicle on the highway, resulting in a Class B accident.  In this case, the safety 
features in place were not adequate to prevent an accident involving property on 
the ground; no one was injured during this accident. 
 
Does UAS pilot training reduce the number of UAS accidents? The 
FAA Roadmap (2013) highlights the importance of training to help increase 
safety.  The Roadmap (2013) emphasizes the importance of pilot training but also 
continues to require training for flight crewmembers, mechanics and air traffic 
controllers.  The FAA recognized that for safe operations to occur for UAS 
flights, it does not only involve the pilot but also other crew members such as 
sensor operators, crew chiefs and the controllers that over watch the airways.  The 
Roadmap (2013) details the training requirements for each of these members and 
explains, “UAS training standards will mirror manned aircraft training standards 
to the maximum extent possible,” (FAA, 2013a, p. 28).  According to Research 
Subject #3, “the second most important issue is training; there is a misconception 
that less training is required to pilot an RPA.  I can tell you from experience that 
is not the case due to the reduced situational awareness (SA) and inherent delay in 
the RPA operations.”  It is evident that training is vital to the safe operations of 
the UAS. 
 
The FAA Roadmap (2013) identifies pilot training as a significant 
requirement for UAS integration into the NAS.  The Roadmap states, “as new 
UAS evolve, more specific training will be developed for UAS pilots, crew 
members and certified flight instructors,” (FAA, 2013a, p. 33).  The Roadmap 
designated a section to iterate the goals for UAS training requirements and 
provide metrics to support. 
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The FAA roadmap does not take into account the training that US military 
UAS pilots receive, and in many cases Air Force UAS pilots are previously 
trained manned aircraft pilots that have been selected for special duty as a UAS 
pilot.  USAF UAS pilots are required “to complete about 140 hours of academics, 
must pass seven tests and run through 36 missions on T-6 simulators, for 48 hours 
of training (Tan, 2011).”  The FAA is taking steps by including pilots, crew, 
maintenance, instructors, and FSDO to ensure the proper and adequate training 
for all involved with UAS flight within the NAS. 
 
Research Subject #3 describes that one of the greatest concerns for the 
integration of the UAS in the NAS is “lack of training for most, smaller UAS 
operators.”  Research Subject #3 stated that “this is not the time to develop UAS 
‘sport pilot’ equivalent certificate for any civilian operated quad-copter or smaller 
platform…but due to system limitations inherent to most UAS, including reduced 
ability to sense and avoid, solid training and procedures are required to safely 
integrate within the NAS.”  Research Subject #2, a Senior Pilot and Evaluator 
Pilot for the MQ-9 as well as F-16 and EA-6B, echoes Subject #3 with regards to 
training.  Research Subject #2 stated that to rectify concerns would be to “educate 
the aviation community as a whole about UAS operations, in particular education 
should focus on capabilities and limitations of the RPA and about the training the 
pilot receives.”  Research Subject #2 continued to state, “the FAA/ATC can take 
many lessons on RPA incorporation with manned aircraft and operations in the 
NAS from the military.  Specifically, they can model civilian operations after the 
operations from major operating airfields and airspaces in combat areas.”  The 
FAA Roadmap (2013) seems to take this into account as they have included 
training for more than just the pilot, crew and ATC.  The Roadmap (2013) states 
that the UAS pilots must be trained as would a manned aircraft pilot, but this 
training may not be adequate enough and should go above and beyond.   
 
As Research Subject #2 stated the capabilities and limitations of the UAS 
must be educated to the aviation community; Research Subject #3 stated that 
training is vital and “RPA pilots need to have a base of experience on which to 
relate,” Subject #3 stated that “when piloting an RPA, it’s impossible to ‘feel’ the 
sensation of the aircraft oscillating (during turbulence) and the pilots must rely on 
experience and their instruments to diagnose this.”  Educating and training pilots 
is essential in the safe operations of the UAS in the NAS, and training policies set 
by the FAA should mandate these training requirements that build on experience 
and knowledge. 
 
As a result of the interviews, the following nine themes emerged: 
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 Tremendous growth of micro UAVs and certification process required to 
operate them 
 Public misunderstandings of UAS capabilities  
 Public capability expectations of UAS 
 Overall perception that UAS cannot be safely de-conflicted from manned 
aircraft  
 Misconception of increased airspace requirements for UAS 
 Misunderstanding of naming convention of UAS in “Lost Link” event and 
ATC use of terms - when in a lost link event, the UAS goes into 
“Emergency Mission Mode” and follows way points to designated area; 
this does not mean the UAS is an “Emergency Aircraft.” 
 Lack of training for most, smaller UAS operators 
 For USAF Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA), the lack of TCAS 
 Lack of USAF RPA divert options due to launch & recovery equipment 
requirements 
 
Research subject survey 
 
To gather the qualitative information required for this research study, a 22 
Likert-type scale designed to solicit information on concern with the integration 
of the UAS in the NAS from the research subjects.  Seven UAS pilots and Sensor 
Operators completed the survey.  The interview portion of the qualitative study 
was completed with three of the pilots that completed the research survey. The 
seven interview questions were designed to allow the pilots to provide additional 
insight into their concerns with the integration of UAS into the NAS. Due to 
locality limitations, the interviews were conducted via email.   
 
The 22 Likert-type scale focused on safety and concerns related to flight 
operations in different stages of flight, accidents involving UAS during different 
stages of flight, UAS accidents due to mechanical, electrical issues and concern of 
UAS accidents based on NAS oversaturation.  The Likert-Scale statements 
consisted of rankings:  1 – Not at all concerned, 2 – Slightly concerned, 3 – 
Moderately concerned, 4 – Very concerned, and 5 – Extremely concerned. The 
overall mean was 1.82 (level 2, slightly concerned) and Table 2 displays the mean 
answer for each question of the safety section of the questionnaire.    
 
The first three statements of the survey focused on the research subjects’ 
concern with safety of flight within the United States and saturation of the NAS.  
When asked if the subject believed domestic flights are unsafe, all seven 
answered the question with a mean concern level of 2 (Slightly concerned).  
When questioned about the current oversaturation of the NAS, all seven 
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participants answered with a mean concern level of 2.  The next group of 
questions focused on safety concerns and phases of flight. 
 
Table 2 
Safety Concerns Questionnaire 
 
Safety Concern Section  
Question # 
Mean 
Answer 
Question 
# 
Mean 
Answer 
1 2 12 1.71 
2 2.57 13 1.71 
3 2 14 2.29 
4 2 15 1.86 
5 1.86 16 1.43 
6 2.14 17 1.57 
7 1.53 18 1.43 
8 2.29 19 1.71 
9 1.43 20 1.71 
10 1.71 21 2.29 
11 1.43 22 1.86 
 
The research subjects were questioned about safety concerns with regards 
to aircraft accidents involving a UAS during three phases of flight (takeoff, cruise 
and landing); the average level of concern between the seven subjects were 1.98, 
or level 2 (slightly concerned).  The participants were then questioned with 
regards to an UAS accident occurring during a lost link event, all participants 
responded, with a mean level of concern being 1.71.  Two participants answered 
they were “Not at all concerned” (level 1) and the remaining five answered they 
were “Slightly concerned” (level 2).  The next two questions pertained to UAS 
accidents involving midair collisions.  All seven participants answered the midair 
collision question, resulting in a mean level of concern being 2.29.  When 
questioned about the increase of potential accidents with terrain (homes, 
buildings, roads and populated areas), all seven participants responded that 
resulted in a mean level of concern of 1.86.  
 
The final section of statements posed to the seven participants focused on 
safety concerns with regards to an increase of congestion with UAS in the NAS.  
When questioned about an increase in aircraft accidents with a UAS during 
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takeoff, cruise and landing, the participants averaged concern response were 1.71, 
1.71 and 1.43 respectively with an overall mean of 1.61 (level 2).  Again, the 
participants were surveyed on a lost link scenario and all answers provided a 
mean of 1.71, no change from an earlier statement pertaining to lost link 
accidents.   
 
Conclusions 
 
Research Objective:  Based on the most common UAS accidents causes 
and US Air Force UAS instructor and evaluator pilots and sensor operators, is 
there a relationship between safety concerns and safety issues? 
 
Between 2009 and 2014, there were 417 reported accidents by the US Air 
Force (USAF), US Navy (USN) and US Army (USA) involving UAS.  Of those 
accidents, the USAF reported 45, USA reported 324 and the USN reported 48. Of 
the common causes, pilot error (PE), engine failure (E), loss of control (CT), lost 
link (LL) and other (O), the most common accident cause was engine failure.  
From 2009-2014, there were at total of 145 engine failure incidents that resulted 
in a crash of a UAS.  The Army (USA) led the field with 120 reported engine 
failures that resulted in a Class A, B, C or D accident.  Most of the USA accidents 
resulted in a Class C incident (74), which made up 47% of all Class C USA 
accidents reported (159).   
 
When interviewed, the top three concerns of the UAS pilots and sensor 
operators did not relate to the number of accidents or types of accidents, as the 
concerns involved policy and perception and not accident involvement. 
 
The Likert-Scale findings of this study showed elevated concern of 
accidents during a specific phase of flight (takeoff & landing), and the amount of 
respondent concern of those types accidents occurring.  Results also indicate a 
low number of incidents and accidents occurring during the cruise phase of flight 
and the low level of respondent concern with accidents occurring during that 
phase of flight.  The calculated percentage of accidents during each specific phase 
of flight was categorized low to high: low- 0-29%; medium- 30-50%; high- 
>51%.   
 
During the takeoff phase of flight there were a total of 84 accidents of 405 
accidents that occurred during one of the three phases of flight (other phase of 
flight not calculated) and amounted to 21% of the number of accidents.  
Respondent concern of accidents during this phase of flight was also low.     
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During the cruise phase of flight there were a total of 218 accidents of 405 
total accidents that occurred during one of the three phases of flight (other phase 
of flight not calculated) and amounted to 54% of the number of accidents.  
Respondent level of concern of this phase of flight was low in comparison to the 
higher level of accidents.   
 
During the landing phase of flight there were a total of 103 accidents of 
405 accidents that occurred during one of the three phases of flight (other phase of 
flight not calculated) and amounted to 25% of the number of accidents.  
Respondent concern of the landing phase was low.    
 
Midair and near midair accidents and level of concern were observed, with 
a 15 near midair collisions and 2 midair collisions being reported.  Of the 405 
total accidents that were recorded, 4% could have involved a near midair incident; 
near midair reports were not calculated in the total number of accidents observed.  
Less than 1% of the accidents observed involved a midair collision.  Results of 
the three sections questioning the level of concern related to midair incidents and 
accidents indicated a slight respondent concern of midair collisions.    
 
Recommendations 
 
The FAA has crafted FAA Roadmap 2013 and implemented the UAS 
Integration Office to support the integration and operations of UAS.  The FAA 
should continue to refine the Roadmap as it is integrated and update policy and 
regulations as required.  The UAS Integration Office should provide UAS 
operators a way to provide feedback and lessons learned to make the process, 
procedures and operations of the UAS safer and efficient.  Additionally, the FAA 
should research ways to deal with and implement contingency plans for 
unintentional and deliberate accidents involving UAS and further legislation must 
budget for the increased requirements.     
 
The FAA Roadmap 2013 stresses the importance of training pilots, crews, 
maintenance and air traffic controllers on UAS operations and this should 
continue and evolve as the integration progresses.  The training provided should 
be monitored and reviewed by Flight Standard District Office (FSDO) Inspectors 
and held to the same standards as manned aircraft and pilots.  The FAA must 
create and uphold a standards and evaluations system that mirror manned flight 
operations but is also unique to UAS flight operations.  FSDO Inspectors should 
provide inputs into the success and failures of such a system as they gather 
information from field inspections.  
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The public perception of UAS is garnered from what is seen in media. 
This may skew views on operations and safety of the UAS.  The public may not 
have a good understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the UAS as well 
as the background and concept of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act 2012.  
Research Subject #1 and #2 stated that their concerns included, “public 
misunderstandings of UAS capabilities, public capability expectations of UAS, 
overall perception that UAS cannot be safely de-conflicted from manned aircraft 
and misconception of increased airspace requirements for UAS.”  The UAS 
Integration Office should research and implement a public service campaign to 
inform the public of UAS operations, the concept of the Reform Act and way 
forward for the safe integration of the UAS into NAS.  This campaign’s focus 
should aim to inform the public of UAS operations and convey a positive 
perception of UAS use and safety issues.  The UAS Integration Office must 
implement a way to track safety issues, such as accidents, near mid-air and mid-
air collisions as well as any research done on UAS operations and provide public 
accessibility to this database for review. 
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Appendix A 
 
Safety Concern Questionnaire 
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SAFETY: 
1  2     3             4            5  
Not Concerned Slightly Concerned    Moderately Concerned   Very Concerned     Extremely Concerned 
On a scale of 1 - 5 with regards to standard manned flight, please rate your level of 
concern as it pertains to:  
1. Belief that flying within the domestic United States is not safe? 
1  2 3 4 5 
 
2. Domestic airliner’s safety record when you are flying in a commercial airliner? 
1  2 3 4 5 
 
3. Oversaturation of the NAS with airplane operations? 
1  2 3 4 5 
 
4. Mid air collisions when you fly? 
1  2 3 4 5 
 
5. Runway incursions when you fly? 
1  2 3 4 5 
 
6. Being involved in an aircraft accident during takeoff? 
1  2 3 4 5 
 
7. Being involved in an aircraft accident at cruise altitude? 
1  2 3 4 5 
 
8. Being involved in an aircraft accident during landing? 
1  2 3 4 5 
 
Based on an increase of UAS in the NAS, on a level of 1 - 5 how concerned are you: 
9. Being involved in an aircraft accident with a UAS during takeoff? 
1  2 3 4 5 
 
10. Being involved in an aircraft accident with a UAS during cruise? 
1  2 3 4 5 
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11. Being involved in an aircraft accident with a UAS during landing? 
1  2 3 4 5 
 
12. If you knew that a UAS had less safety equipment than commercial airliners, how 
concerned would you be for airspace safety? 
1  2 3 4 5 
 
13. Based on your understanding and knowledge of UASs, how concerned are you that 
an accident would occur if a UAS lost its data connection to the operator? 
1  2 3 4 5 
 
14. How concerned are you that UAS in the national airspace system would cause more 
mid air collisions? 
1  2 3 4 5 
 
15. How concerned are you that the UAS in the national airspace system would increase 
the potential of accidents with terrain (i.e. homes, buildings, roads, populated areas)? 
1   2 3 4 5 
 
16. There will be an increase in aircraft accidents with a UAS during takeoff? 
1  2 3 4 5 
 
17. There will be increases in aircraft accidents with a UAS during cruise? 
1  2 3 4 5 
 
18. An increase in aircraft accidents with a UAS during landing? 
1  2 3 4 5 
 
19. Based on your knowledge of UASs safety features, how concerned would you be for 
airspace safety? 
1  2 3 4 5 
 
20. Based on your knowledge of UASs, how concerned are you that an accident would 
occur if a UAS lost its data connection to the operator? 
1  2 3 4 5 
 
21. How concerned are you that UAS in the national airspace system would cause more 
mid air collisions? 
1  2 3 4 5 
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 22. How concerned are you that the UAS in the national airspace system would increase 
the potential of accidents with terrain (i.e. homes, buildings, roads, populated areas)? 
1  2 3 4 5 
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Appendix B 
 
Interview Questions 
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 Briefly describe your aviation experience to include training, flight hours, pilot or 
aircrew experience. 
 Briefly describe your experience and knowledge of unmanned aerial systems to 
include any piloting or sensor operator experience or any research you’ve 
accomplished. 
 Briefly describe your duties in the current position you hold to include training, 
years of experience and daily duties. 
 Describe your experience conducting safety inspections, mishap investigations 
and/or accident investigations. 
 Based on your answers to the unmanned aerial system (UAS) safety 
questionnaire, describe in your professional opinion the top three greatest 
concerns you have with the integration of the UAS in the National Airspace 
System (NAS). 
 Based on your answers to your greatest concerns of the UAS integration into the 
NAS, what needs to be done to rectify those top three concerns? 
 In your overall assessment, do you feel the integration of the UAS into the NAS 
is a major safety concern or do you feel that with the current direction of the 
integration there will be minimal impact to safety? 
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